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Book Reviews
Ex Nihilo Nihil
The Birth of the English Common Law. By R. C. Van Caenegem.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. vii, 160. $8.50.
Reviewed by Morris S. Arnoldt
Royal justice was rarely invoked in England at the beginning of the
twelfth century, but, as many medievalists have recently noted, during
the course of the century it became generally available to litigants and
was more or less commonly sought in lieu of feudal or seignorial jus-
tice.' This remarkable and indisputable development is apparent from
even a cursory comparison of the Leges Henrici Primi (circa 1115)2
with Glanvill's Tractatus de Legibus (circa 1188). 3 Yet the exact steps
in this process, and more important, the theories of government that
made the change possible, have been the subject of much debate. The
work of Professor Van Caenegem has been conspicuous in this debate,
and his present book, as its author notes, is in the main an abridged
recapitulation of the views expressed at much greater length in his
Royal Writs in England from the Conquest to Glanvill.4 It is good to
have those ideas in the more succinct and accessible form in which
they are now presented.5
The gradual displacement of local courts by central royal justice was
once seen in terms of a jurisdictional battle between a grasping and
usurping central government and a local nobility less than willing to
surrender judicial power. Magna Carta, clause 34-which prohibits
+ Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
1. The primary contributions are H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, THE GOVERNANCE OF
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA (1963); D. STENTON, ENGLISH
JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE GREAT CHARTER: 1055-1215 (1966);
R. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL (1959).
2. The modern edition is L. DOWNER, LEGES HENRICI PRIMI (1972).
3. The best edition is G. HALL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI
ANGLIE QUI GLANVILLA VOCATUR (1965).
4. R. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 1.
5. R. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAw (1973) [hereinafter
cited to page number only].
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"the writ praecipe by which a free man may lose his court"-was
viewed as an attempt (although all realize it proved futile) to restore
in some measure the original jurisdictional autonomy of the feudal
lords; thus some modern commentators have arrayed imperial preten-
sions against local sovereignty.0 This was exciting stuff, providing his-
torians of the cataclysmic school opportunities to speculate on the per-
sonal characters of the principal actors-of Henry II, Richard, and espe-
cially John-and to develop sweeping generalities based on the "na-
tional spirit" of the English. All this is now antique, however, because
a more sober examination of the sources has uncovered complexities
against which these modes of analysis are impotent.7 Modem historical
thought tends to minimize drastically the competitive nature of the
centralizing forces and underplay the confrontation between feudal
and royal jurisdiction.8
It seems more accurate now to describe the disappearance of feudal
jurisdictions as a gradual withering process and to see the concomitant
triumph of royal justice as a development which the feudal magnates
acquiesced in or even actively encouraged.9 Our understanding of the
broad trends in the twelfth century accommodates this description. In
a truly feudal world the lord's right to decide in his own court cases
involving land in his fee was obviously the crucial element of feudal
jurisdiction: for to decide rights to land in the fee was to decide who
could enter the lord's land. This unremarkable power to exclude an
interloper remains one of the ordinary indicia of ownership in present-
day law; it flows less from public notions of jurisdiction than from
private notions of property. The economic revival and expanding
money economy of the twelfth century led in part to an increased use
of paid troops, 10 which in turn helped diminish the lord's power over
his land and tenants. So also did natural occasions for the applications
6. See, e.g., V. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 346 (2d ed. 1914): "In extorting from
John a solemn promise to restrict the use of this particular writ, the barons gained
something of infinitely greater value than a petty reform of court procedure; they
committed their enemy to a reversal of a line of policy vigorously pursued for half
a century. The process by which the jurisdiction of the King's courts was undermining
that of the feudal courts was now to be arrested."
7. Hurnard, Magna Carta Clause 34, in STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY PRESENTED TO
F.M. POWICKE 157 (R. Hunt ed. 1948).
8. H. RICHARDSON 9- G. SAYLES, supra note 1, at 384, devote almost no time to the
feudal courts and state that clause 34 was merely intended "to simplify the procedure
under which a lord claimed an action for his own court."
9. See, e.g., Hurnard, supra note 7. Magna Carta, clause 17, providing that the
court of common pleas should be held at some fixed place, and clause 18, providing
for regular visits of assize justices, indicate quite clearly that the feudal classes had
no general objection to royal justice.
10. See C. HOLLISTER, THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF NORMAN ENGLAND 270 passim
(1965).
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of the lord's justice diminish; as he lost what would now be called the
elements of ownership over property, his jurisdiction-based on control
of property-disappeared.
A good story would be needlessly lost, however, by a refusal to see
any competition at all between baronial and central courts. Magna
Carta, clause 34, must stand for more than the symbolic assertion of
seignorial rights long obsolete and abandoned." First, although the
twelfth century development of the tenant's powers of alienation and
heir's right of inheritance severely restricted the lord's "ownership"
rights in his fees, 12 nonetheless the incidents of feudal tenure remained
quite lucrative. The lord's desire to maintain these incidents, such as
wardships and marriages, would result in some continued interest in
retaining jurisdiction over rights to land. Second, the mere existence
of clause 34 indicates that lords desired to keep at least ultimate juris-
diction over the question of entitlement to lands within their respec-
tive fiefs. The only other explanation is that the barons, in a fit of
pique, insisted on including in Magna Carta an undesired concession
which they forced from the defeated king only to demonstrate their
awful power over him. This rationale must surely be a distortion, a
fit of fancy.
Richardson and Sayles, in their recent book, have gone a great dis-
tance toward dismantling the neat and inaccurate picture of English
medieval government as a vertical hierarchy conforming to some rigid
feudal organizing principle, with the king as suzerain only.' 3 Yet even
if the king was always something more than the richest and most pow-
erful landlord in England, and even if the English structure of gov-
ernment was far flatter than strict feudal theory would admit, antipathy
and competition between seignorial and royal justice nevertheless must
have existed at some level. The particular writ praecipe quod reddat
at which clause 34 was evidently aimed robbed the lord's court of first-
instance jurisdiction: It short-circuited the feudal framework and
brought litigation directly to the Curia Regis. Apparently the writ an-
noyed the nobility enough to insist on clause 34, by which they indi-
cated some intention to retain their lordly jurisdictions. It seems, then,
that the assize of novel disseisin, the invention of Henry II's reign
which extended to all freeholders disseised "unjustly and without judg-
11. Clanchy, Magna Carta, Clause Thirty-Four, 79 ENc. HIST. REv. 542 (1964), makes
clear what was not clear before: the writ praecipe quod reddat disappeared altogether
after Magna Carta and was replaced by the writs praecipe in capite and praecipe quia
dorninus remisit curiam suam.
12. See Thorne, English Feudalism and Estates in Land, 1959 CATAB. L.J. 193 (1959).
13. See generally H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYL.s, supra note 1.
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ment" the efficiencies of direct royal justice, was on its face an interfer-
ence in feudal jurisdictions which would be met with resentment. Thus,
instead of denying the likelihood of resentment, it seems necessary to
devise a theory accounting for the lords' acceptance of this encroach-
ment on their jurisdictional domains.
The barons, apparently, were content to permit the king his action
of novel disseisin but kept for themselves the ultimate power to decide
the question of the right to land.14 This compromise, ideally suited to
a system of dual sovereignty, vindicated the central authority's right to
enforce order through summary process-for the assize was "possessory"
-and yet recognized that the lord, by the writ of right, had jurisdiction
over the ultimate question of entitlement. Henry II himself may have
claimed some personal jurisdiction over land. The Norman kings had
been careful to claim from St. Edward by hereditary right and had
reinforced their putative Englishness by confirming to the English
their old laws. In succeeding to the Anglo-Saxon throne, Henry may
have considered himself to be succeeding also to the jurisdiction over
land exercised by early English kings. When forcefully and unpleas-
antly presented with the ecclesiastical theory of the state in his con-
frontation with the church, moreover, Henry may have adopted for
his imperial purposes the church's description of the king as "the min-
ister of the common interest . . . [who] bears the public person in the
sense that he punishes the wrongs and injuries of all ... ."I; The lords'
claims, on the other hand, were sanctioned by long years of feudal cus-
tom and by the logic of private property as it was then understood.
The argument over ultimate jurisdiction of questions of entitlement
to land was mooted, in a large number of cases, perhaps a majority,
because the outcome of the assize would dictate a similar result in an
action on the right. This would be most obviously true of the praecipe
writs of entry which proliferated after Magna Carta;' hardly ever
would a writ of right, though always theoretically available, produce
a result different from the judgment on a writ of entry. The later de-
velopment of elaborate proprietary pleas in bar to the assize of novel
disseisin 17 also helped diminish the number of occasions when resort
to a writ of right, and thus to feudal jurisdiction, would be a worth-
while enterprise. The marginal feudal jurisdiction, in effect, existed in
the theoretical region between actions asserting absolute rights to land
14. Magna Carta provided for regular visits of the assize. See note 9 supra.
15. JOHN OF SALISBURY, POLICRATICUS 7 (J. Dickinson transl. 1963).
16. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 62
passim (2d ed. reissued 1968).
17. See D. SUTHERLAND, THE ASSIZE OF NovEL DISSEISIN 153 passim (1973).
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and less droiturel actions such as the assize. In the twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries, this region shrank nearly to nothingness. There-
fore the lord who complained of the interferences of royal jurisdiction
evidently would have to be satisfied with the reply that his jurisdic-
tion remained intact: The writ of right was still available, and be-
longed to the feudal courts. The general feudal proposition that land
cases belong to the lord of the land was exploded. Yet the odd structure
of English real remedies-the vertical progression from purely posses-
sory to absolutely droiturel-bears the imprint of the old vertical feudal
world which it eventually brought down; in fact, the remedies may
have assumed their odd structure as a result of efforts to circumvent
the levels of authority in the vertical feudal world.
A somewhat different explanation of novel disseisin's role in the
developing government structures of the twelfth century has been of-
fered recently by Professor Milsom.' s He sees the assize as initially
designed to buttress the feudal tenant-lord relationship by providing
tenants royal remedies against lords acting contrary to feudal prin-
ciples. The assize, he maintains, was originally designed to operate
against lords as disseisers. He deduces this theory partly from the opin-
ion that the verb "to seize" was employed originally to describe what
a lord does when he puts his tenant in possession; to "disseise," there-
fore, is what a lord does when he puts his tenant out of possession
"unjustly and without judgment." Milsom's idea is quite appealing,
and it is not altogether unlikely.that a desire to protect tenants against
lords generated the assize. Professor Sutherland, in his new book on
the action,19 sees it otherwise; but both Milsom and Sutherland agree
that the assize, far from buttressing feudal jurisdictions, in the end
contributed significantly to their collapse. 20 In any event, the lords
perhaps were never comforted by the idea that the assize would pre-
serve the feudal order and the effects of the assize would certainly jus-
tify lordly disquiet from its very inception.
Professor Sutherland's book appeared too late for Van Caenegem
to deal with in The Birth of the English Common Law, but it seems
singularly odd that he has ignored Professor Milsom's striking thesis
of the assize's origin. At any rate, Professor Van Caenegem has a very
different explanation of the growth of royal jurisdiction. He sees the
growing royal jurisdiction as the natural solution to the confusion
18. S. MIL'OM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 118-19 (1969); Milsom,
Introduction to 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 16, at xl-xliv.
19. D. SUTHERLAND, supra note 17. at 30-31, 214-15.
20. S. Mimsom, supra note 18, at 119; D. SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 80 passim.
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engendered by the welter of local courts, ecclesiastical and secular,
to which application for redress might properly be made in the days of
the Norman kings. The old English courts (the county and the hun-
dred) were left intact by the conquerors, and the feudal courts were
instituted by their side. The question of proper venue for a particular
action could be enormously complex and "the inevitable result of it
all was a good deal of overlapping, uncertainty and confusion .... It
is no wonder that many court records leave an impression of basic
weakness, hesitation and slowness." 21 So, he concludes, royal orders
to do right "without delay" were necessary to cure the "evil of the
age": penuria recti or defectus justicie.22
Professor Van Caenegem's assessment of the impotence of feudal and
other local courts may be exaggerated and is, in any event, almost en-
tirely conjectural.2 3 Moreover, the connection between the availability
of a number of courts and the assertion that there was a resulting lack
of justice is tenuous. Nevertheless, Van Caenegem is right to see the
procedural difficulties inherent in such a fragmented system, especially
when the parties lived in different fiefs. American lawyers may see cen-
tral court jurisdiction in such instances as analogous to the federal
diversity jurisdiction; but whereas the development of a federal com-
mon law in such cases was halted by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 24
the English central courts developed a law which applied in all cases
regardless of the residence of the parties or site of the action. Van
Caenegem refers quite frequently to this common law,2 5 yet while its
existence cannot be denied it should be xemembered that the royal
justices often ruled according to well-established local custom rather
than the general common law. Bracton marks many local peculiarities,
and he constantly had to qualify his generalities by references to pos-
sible local aberrations.
I
Van Caenegem's explanation of the growth of English royal justice
includes his famous "judicialization" theory: that many common law
writs began as mere executive orders and only later became means to
initiate litigation-i.e., writs of summons.20 Royal intervention in
feudal jurisdictions began in these executive orders: these were writs
of command issued after an ex parte hearing of a claimant's story; the
21. Pp. 15-16.
22. P. 17.
23. For citations to the literature on this subject, see D. SuTHERLAND, supra note
17, at 214-15.
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. See, e.g., pp. 20, 22, 24, 29, 90, 91.
26. Pp. 33 passim.
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king or his ministers would peremptorily command an unheard ad-
versary, or a royal minister, to restore to the petitioner some right
which was withheld. This could lead, the argument runs, to the ad-
versary obtaining a rescinding command, thus producing what the
author calls a "war of writs." 27 The solution was "to judicialize royal
interventions, i.e., to surround them with the necessary judicial guar-
antees, to ensure fair examination of the merits of the case .... "28 In
this fashion "judicialization turned these executive measures into
original writs and judicial instruments initiating formal lawsuits . . .29
The evidence for Professor Van Caenegem's theory is, first, the form
which the praecipe writ exhibited for centuries: It commenced with a
mere order to do or stop doing something and when it came to be em-
ployed to initiate litigation, the argument runs, a clause was tacked
on the end commanding the offender to come and tell the king's
court why he did not do as ordered. The writ praecipe was thus "not
redrafted after it became a simple writ of summons, but nobody ex-
pected the opening command-a mere fossil-to be carried out."30
Professor Van Caenegem's interpretation of the available evidence as
supporting his judicialization pattern is not unreasonable, and indeed
the theory has a certain amount of appeal. It may well be that some
of the common law writs in some way have their beginnings in earlier
executive prototypes.
Some caution, nonetheless, is appropriate before accepting Van
Caenegem's "judicialization" theory. There is, first, no way of know-
ing what lay in the mind of the king or, more likely, the king's min-
isters, when certain ex parte orders were issued. It is not at all clear,
for instance, that some of these peremptory writs might not have been
employed in much the same way as temporary restraining orders are
today. Thus, further litigation may have been contemplated after the
issuing of certain praecipe writs, even without the "show cause order"
added to the end of the writ. Moreover, some praecipe writs may have
been used as writs of execution after a full hearing; because they fail
to recite the existence of a hearing preceding the writ's issue, they may
appear falsely as mere ex parte orders.
II
In his new book, Professor Van Caenegem interests himself again
in the extent to which the English legal system is indebted to foreign
27. Pp. 37, 56.
28. P. 39.
29. P. 34.
30. Pp. 50-51.
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influences for its institutions and ideas of liability. To the debate over
the origin of the jury not much can be added. The jury's central idea,
that the best way to discover facts is to ask people who live in the
vicinity where the facts presumably occurred, is simple enough that
one need not impute it to any administrative genius-either of the
Normans or anybody else.31 Professor Van Caenegem sees the jury as
a tertium quid, an amalgam of Norman and indigenous Anglo-Saxon
fact-finding institutions.32 That there was a Norman contribution at
all, however, is difficult to maintain since there is not one example
known of the use of a jury in Normandy prior to 1066.33 Perhaps it
is not irrelevant to note that the most assiduous supporters of Norman
origins for the jury are continental writers;34 English medievalists, on
the other hand, have stoutly, and almost unanimously, argued for the
jury's insular roots. 35
A more interesting question, however, is the debt, if any, which
English law owes to the twelfth-century Roman law revival on the
continent. Much literature has been devoted to this subject,36 and
happily it has recently attracted a number of new investigators.37 Van
Caenegem himself has made large and interesting contributions in this
area; 38 and his book is perhaps most interesting when treating this
question.39 Most scholars agree that true substantive borrowings, such
as rules resulting from raids on the Corpus Juris Civilis and its asso-
ciated literature, are extremely rare. A body of law, after all, is not
an isolated intellectual system which can be transferred at will to dif-
ferent societies without regard to the political and economic environ-
ment in which its rules must operate.40 The Roman revival, however,
may have made popular the perception that the law could be ap-
proached scientifically, organized according to principle, and, perhaps,
manipulated for the sovereign's purposes. English lawyers took some
time to learn these lessons, but the example of the Roman lawyers may
have provided helpful impetus.
31. For the view that the jury was imported by the Normans, see H. BRUNNER,
DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER SCHWURGERICHTE (1871).
32. Pp. 72-73.
33. Van Caenegem himself makes this point. P. 74.
34. See, e.g., H. BRUNNER, supra note 31.
35. See, e.g., H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, supra note 1, at 205-08.
36. See generally Plucknett, The Relations Between Roman Law and English Com-
mon Law down to the Sixteenth Century: A General Survey, 3 TORONTO L.J. 24 (1939).
37. D. SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 20-24, makes the latest contribution to the
question of the Romano-canonical influences on the assize of novel disseisin.
38. See R. VAN CAENECEM, supra note 1, at 349-90.
39. Pp. 85-110.
40. See Thorne, English Law and the Renaissance, in LA STORIA DEL DmR-ro NEL
QUADRO DELLE SCIENZE STORICHE 437 (1966).
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There are, further, two principal reasons why English legal historians
ought to devote attention to the medieval Roman law. The first, and
more obvious, is that an insular immersion in English law may give
a student the sense that its rules are the inevitable products of reason
and observation-as medieval English lawyers themselves believed.
Historians may dispel that illusion by revealing to students that other
equally "reasonable" rules of law existed in the middle ages which
were capable of solving legal problems. A second reason for familiarity
with Roman law principles rests on the odd circumstance that con-
tinental legal systems were greatly affected by those principles while
England's law shows almost no substantive influence. Why did England
alone remain relatively unaffected?
Professor Van Caenegem alludes to several possible explanations, 41
but in the end he attributes the English aberration to the fact that "a
centralized and modernized legal system took place exceptionally early
in England (and Normandy) before Roman law was in a position to
exert any profound influence."4 2 This explanation, however, as Van
Caenegem realizes, 43 only leads one to ask why the English were in this
respect so precocious. The old Anglo-Saxon state was certainly remark-
ably centralized and modern for its day;4 4 and no doubt the Norman
conquest was facilitated by the pre-Hastings centralization of govern-
ment in the country.45 And so the common law for the most part
eluded the influence of the universities which flourished later in the
middle ages; it was born and continued "an anomaly, a freak in the
history of western civilization, less modern because it was modernized
earlier . . . ."46 Yet still unelaborated are the reasons for the early
coherence of English law.
III
Professor Van Caenegem's patient and exhaustive work in the scat-
tered records of this period has greatly increased our knowledge of the
details and causes of the significant legal changes occurring in twelfth-
century England. Some caveats, however, perhaps may be usefully
advanced here. Van Caenegem's concentration on writs-necessary
since other sources, though not entirely wanting, are meager47-almost
41. Pp. 86 passim.
42. P. 90.
43. P. 92.
44. P. 107.
45. Cf. J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAv 295 (1960).
46. P. 105.
47. Professor Van Caenegem is presently at work on a replacement for M. BiGELOW,
PLACITA ANGLO-NORMANICA (1879), which is a compilation of reports of cases gleaned
from chronicles and other descriptions of actual litigation.
The Yale Law Journal
inevitably turns the reader's thoughts to those supposedly ineradicable
categories known as the "Forms of Action." 48 The association of the
growth of the common law's substantive ideas with the growth of writs
has in the past resulted in the false view that the substantive idea repre-
sented in a later form of action, or writ, somehow grew out of a simpler
substantive idea present in an earlier, simpler writ. This seductive idea
may be irresistible to a generation whose minds are polluted in the
social sciences by the Idea of Progress and in the physical sciences by
Darwinism. But Professor Milsom demonstrated convincingly in his
work on the "action" of trespass, for instance, that there is no such
simple relationship between earlier and later writs employed to
redress wrongs.49 It seems likely that other examples can be exposed
after a systematic, comprehensive examination of available plea roll
evidence.
An association of the change in the Registra Brevium with the
growth of the law, then, may promote the mistaken impression that
legal thought about remediable wrongs developed in the same ways
as did the Register. The truth more often is that the appearance of new
royal remedies represents a jurisdictional shift from the local or even
ecclesiastical courts into the royal courts. Inventions of novel sub-
stantive liabilities in medieval England are extremely rare, perhaps
virtually nonexistent. No doubt some statuses changed; for instance,
a guardian in socage did become liable to account.50 And the notion
of strict liability for damages in a particular set of circumstances occa-
sionally might relax sufficiently to admit some concept of culpable
negligence. Generally, however, the subtler rules of liability are not
to be perceived in the wording of writs. It is more likely that "rules"
of this sort are to be discerned not by investigating the mysteries of
chancery pleading or even the erudite verbal fencing of serjeants-at-
law, but instead are to be discovered by reconstructing the attitudes
of the community whose representatives, the jury, had in many in-
stances unbridled authority to decide cases. 51
There is indeed much to be learned still from an examination of
the Register. The legal historian of medieval England who wants to
answer the important questions, however, must develop research tech-
48. Professor Van Caenegem himself invites the reader's attention in this direction.
Pp. 33, 41.
49. Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to Edward III (pts. 1-3), 74 L.Q.R. 195, 407,
561 (1958).
50. Statute of Marlborough, c. 17 (1267). It is possible that the obligation to ac-
count previously existed and only the royal remedy was new.
51. For an example of such a reconstruction, see Green, Societal Concepts of Criminal
Law Liability for Homicide in Medieval England, 47 SPECULUM 669 (1972).
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niques and methods of analysis which face the reality that the life of
the medieval common law did not lie principally in the stereotyped
writs that initiated litigation. The law did come to be so regarded, or
at least the nineteenth-century reformers said it did; but this develop-
ment occurred long after the medieval period. The essential story of
the law's later dependence on writs can be fairly well documented in
the history of attempts to control the jury's authority, although this
story remains to be told. The tendency to see the beginning of this de-
velopment in medieval centuries, however, must be resisted assidu-
ously, and medieval legal history must be seen as something more than
a branch of archival study.
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